Month: May 2011

    

      At one of the dioramas at the Wisconsin’s Veteran’s Museum in Madison, Wisconsin,  stoic, tensed young men in black hats await orders to resist another surge of massed, charging Confederate soldiers in the hellish chaos of battle later referred to as The Cornfield at Antietam in 1862.  They are young men comprised primarily of Wisconsin farmers and city laborers from the 2nd, 6th, and 7th Infantry Regiments and a similar group of men from the 19th Indiana, and later, 24th Michigan.  They know what is about to befall them, and they are braced for what will surely test them to their core.  The officer to the right is about to give the order to fire; a fallen comrade is at their feet to the left and will no longer respond.  There is no doubt to the observer how these men will face their trial of fire, as they were already known by Antietam as a ferocious group of defenders that opponents preferred not to engage.  They were recognized by their army 1858 issue Hardee black hats, that stood in contrast to the more contained kepis worn by other union infantry soldiers.  They were known as the Iron Brigade of the West, and formed the steel backbone of union efforts from Bull Run to Appomattox through the entire breadth of the war.  They are memorialized today, because these young farmers and laborers from the then new state of Wisconsin, in a war known for horrific sacrifice, sustained the greatest number of casualties by percentage of any maintained brigade in the war between the states.  At Gettysburg alone the brigade lost 62%, or 1153 out of 1885 men, the 2nd Wisconsin 77%, the 24th Michigan an astounding 80%.  What brought these unique men together to willfully sacrifice, and continually replenish their catastrophic losses with more of their sons and brothers, again and again, until victory’s relief at Appomattox, is the special calling of all who remembered on this special day of memory for the fallen, Memorial Day.

     The call up in 1861 by President Lincoln for 75,000 90 day volunteers was especially perceived in the West.  The new states of Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), and Minnesota (1858) sought to show their commitment to the Union they had just joined and the importance they felt to the cause of free men.  Governor Randall in Wisconsin had no trouble getting together volunteers.  The regular Army of the United States in 1860 was a minuscule force of which over half the officers took allegiance to the their southern states over their union oath.  Therefore, an officer was essentially any man, other men were willing to follow.  A prominent man could be a Captain if he could support the needs of 80 to 100 men under him, and get them to elect him Captain. A regiment consisted of ten companies and elected a Colonel, two regiments comprised a battalion, and four regiments constituted a brigade, led by a Brigadier General. The approximate 4000 men of the Wisconsin volunteers that started the war were initially led by Rufus King from Milwaukee, a part owner of the Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette newspaper, appointed by Governor Randall to shepard the men into a fighting force.  King had been a graduate of West Point in the 1830’s, and considered one of the state’s few men with any military experience, though it had been decades since he had resigned his commission.  The training commenced at what would later be known as Camp Randall in Madison , the Brigade’s first action was with  the Army of Virginia at the second Bull Run in August of 1862.  General Rufus King, struggling with epilepsy, would not see battle, and was replaced by a succession of Generals that would obtain acclaim as leaders of this steadily more famous group, including Generals Gibbon, Meredith, Bragg, and Kellog. After Bull Run it was transferred into General Joseph Hooker’s First Corps, where it would enter Antietam in September, 1862, as First Brigade, First Division, First Corps,  a position it would proudly hold until the end of the war.

     At Antietam, the southern commanders would experience the first real northern intransigence of the war as exemplified by the rock hard fighting displayed by the Wisconsin Brigade in the hell of the Cornfield in the single most casualty inflicted day in American military history.  Stonewall Jackson wanted to know who it was in “those damned black hats” that proved impenetrable;  the Union commander McClellan, surmised “they must be made of iron” and the Iron Brigade’s reputation was born.  From Antietam, to Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and Overland, Richmond-Petersburg,and finally Appomattox, the black hats absorbed punishing blow after blow, yet unlike so many other regiments that disintegrated from the pressure of replenishing after onslaughts, continued to exist as a cornerstone of the Union infantry attack.

     The battle at Gettysburg with its astounding losses of 70% casualty of the brigade secured its reputation for all time.  General John Reynolds, desperate to attain the high ground on the first day of Gettysburg, until the bulk of the Union Army could arrive, sent the the Iron Brigade into the teeth of overwhelming numbers of Confederates entering the town from the north.  The brigade repulsed the southerner’s attempts at achieving tactical advantage, and managed to decimate the Brigade of General Archer, capturing him and hundreds of other southern soldiers.  The respite proved just enough to allow General Meade to secure the round tops at the gates of Gettysburg and force General Lee to impale himself upon the superior ground and ultimately lose the pivotal battle of the war.  A single black hat, lanced with a bullet through its crown, (photo removed at request of museum) represents the courage, and sacrifice of that epic performance.

     The cemeteries of Wisconsin are full of aging monuments to the over 12,000 fallen heroes of the brigade of young Wisconsin boys of that apocalyptic conflict, the names, and memories, progressively worn away by wind and time.  These were young men, the sons of immigrants and immigrants themselves, that wanted to prove their worth to the nation as a whole, and were willing to sacrifice all for the ideal of the American dream.  On this Memorial Day, the trumpets call out their mournful reveille for young men , from across the state, that wanted everyone to know they were an equal and essential part of the American Experience.  There is no measure for personal sacrifice, no capacity to fully understand, what could drive such people to continue to defy the overwhelming odds, and serve, until the job was done, and the cause was secured.  To all on this Memorial Day, thanks and prayers.  On Wisconsin.

  

   We are coming upon the tenth anniversary of the conflict loosely described as the War on Terror.  In October, 2001, in response to the atrocity of 9/11 and its identification as the most spectacular component of an ongoing organized war by radical Islamic organizations on to the shores of America, the United States initiated combat operations in Afghanistan.  The described aim of the war was to identify and destroy the elements of terror organizations and to decapitate their developing coordination with like-minded governments.  As put forth by President George W. Bush, there would be no separation considered between the terrorists, and the governments that knowingly harbored them.  An initial rapid success followed, with the collapse of the Taliban government and the elimination of Al Qaeda terrorist structure in Afghanistan.  The critical leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda escaped, though, and the war took on the more extended aims and actions that typify the initiation of conflict when ever conflict occurs. The war advanced to remove the tyrant in Iraq.  It required an unhealthy and unstable relationship with Pakistan, a nation torn in half by its desire to be a modern power, and a population that desires to respond to a more reactionary religiously inspired life dogma.  It forced hastily gathered leagues of nations to form military coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, only to have the actual brunt of fighting absorbed by the very few, and the commitment of most to waver.  At ten years, it has achieved identifiable triumphs with the destruction of the financial networks of Al Qaeda, overthrow of Hussein in Iraq and stabilization of a violent battleground, capture of the planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and finally, the death of the original inspiration for the war against America, Osama Bin Laden. Yet it has additionally stirred the secondary effects of sustained conflict, the mutation of radical Islam into other fronts, the emerging position of Iran as a successor to radical instigation, the collapse of governmental structures in the arab world with unclear outcomes and progressive instability, and the ongoing perpetual effort to stabilize the unsolvable problem of Afghanistan.

     America is uncomfortable with  extended conflict.   Its painful wars have tended to have definable ends –  The 8 years of revolutionary war ending in the formation of the country, the brutal four years of the civil war ending slavery and preserving the union, the 5 years of global catastrophe known as World War II ending in complete destruction of totalitarian powers and the unrivalled position of America as the economic and military colossus.   Even the Vietnam War, identified as America’s only “loss”, completed its circle in ten years, with America’s capacity for rapid success returning in 1991 in Kuwait.  The persistently moving endgame, and the enormous cost in material, resources, and blood, cost one president his legacy and led to the election of another committed to the reversal of war directed activities.  The candidate Obama railed against the primary components of the war against terror.  He promised the weary population of America the reversal of the war’s primary weapons in assuring the closure of military confinement of terror combatants at Guantanamo, the stopping of governmental privacy intrusion initiated by the Patriot Act, the removal of forces from Iraq, and the rapid stabilization through intense focus and commitment on the original  incursion of the War on terror, Afghanistan.  The realities of  his position as leader of a warring country has resulted in him failing to achieve any of these stated promises.  In fact, elements of perpetual war are setting in, with the realities of Afghanistan, the threat of Iran, and the expansion of war now on a wholly new and different set of principles to Libya.  As a result, fatigue is developing in the country’s will that has finally begun to cross philosophical boundaries, and may have profound affects on the government’s capacity to sustain conflict. Politico reports a cross section of both Democrats and Republican representatives are beginning to question the very principles for continuing conflict from a common perspective.  Their meeting of minds on the necessity for ending the conflict in Afghanistan bodes poorly for the President continuing to utilize the scenario of “cleaning up the mess” propagated by his political opponents as an acceptable foil for continuing war.

     The conditions of perpetual war are comprehensively understood, and feared by those who study history.  General Colin Powell, fully cognizant of the relatively recent national experience in Vietnam and fearful of historical precedents, defined a national defense posture for American involement in foreign conflicts.  The Powell doctrine stated the components of a conflict involving America should meet the following criteria:

1. A threat to national security is present.

2. A clear objective is definable, and overwhelming  force will be brought to bear to achieve swift conclusion. 

3. The risks and costs have been fully vetted.

4. All other non-violent policy means have been exhausted. 

5. A plausible exit strategy is in place.

6. The consequences of the action have been fully considered.

7. A broad international coalition is in place.

8. The action has the full support of the American people.

     Powell feared perpetual war as a significant danger to a democracy.  The elements of perpetual war include extension across political generations and regimes, the loss of original conflict intent, the conclusion of conflict not through victory but national exhaustion,  and unpredictable outcomes that are contrary to the initial combatant’s goals.  Two conflicts familiar to historians immediately come to mind.  The Hundred Years War between England and France was fought across generations from 1337 to 1453.   The origin of the conflict was a fight over who had the legitimate right to the crown of France. French Normans who had successfully conquered England in 1066 maintained ancestral ties to the French court, and through their rule of the provinces of Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine had control over more of France then the French king himself.  When the French throne in 1337 opened without a viable heir, Edward III, king of England and linked to royal France through the Norman and Anjou provincial House of  Plantagenet sought to enforce his right to the French crown. The house of Valois, the traditional line of French kings had a much different interpretation of history, and the battle was forced.  Over generations and kings the war continued, to the staggering loss of half the French population and much of her wealth.  The presence of superior English battle tactics and crushing wins by Edward III at Crecy in 1346, the Black Prince at Poitiers in 1356, and Henry V at Agincort in 1415 in the long run did little to effect outcome, determined ultimately by the extended logistics required by the English and the vastly larger French population committed to the traditional House of Valois.  Joan of Arc’s brief victory in 1429 at Orleans presaged the steady deterioration of the English position until, ultimately exhausted and over extended, the English were forced to give up their ancestral connections to the continent completely in 1453 and become an island nation only.  The war, extended and so devastating, forced what was once a battle of knights and expensive armour, into a war of standing armies, tactics, economic damage, and nationalist rather than royalist  objectives.  The second example is the Thirty Years War, even more complex in its origins, extensive in its expansion, and devastating in its outcome to the continent. This war from 1618 to 1648,  with origins in the protestant catholic schism of the 16th century, grew from local religious intolerances into a trans-continental struggle involving Spain, France, the germanic Holy Roman Empire, the Ottoman empire, the Dutch and the Danish, and the emerging protestant power of the north, Sweden.  The religious origins became blurred and distorted, with Catholics forming coalitions with Protestants against Catholics, Protestants joining up with Muslims against Catholics, and Protestants fighting amongst themselves.  The outcome over generations grew into the concept of nation states, ratified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, that determined in its essence that catholics and protestants of a country would have to hold fealty to that country over their own religion.  The expense of the conflict was a uniform devastation to the continental economy created by plundering armies and loss of working force, and death to 30 percent of the population of northern Europe.

      The process of perpetual war is well defined and reflects a steady drain on national resources, deterioration in national morale, and progressive loss of capacity for projection of power.  At ten years, with no end in sight, the War on Terror deserves a studied discussion of the means of devolving a nation successfully from conflict, with goals achieved and national integrity intact.  Victory is achievable when it is definable.  Perpetual war is like a pathologic illness, where the perpetuation without victory, turns war into disease management, for an illness with no cure.

     The recent permanent removal by the United States of one of the leading voices in the world for radical Islam, and his desire to “restore” the Islamic Caliphate under shari’a law, has brought up similar instances in history when similar aggressive impulses have been smartly put down by western fortitude.  Of particular note are the efforts of one Charles Martel, leader of the Franks, who in 732, defeated the aggressive invasion out of Iberia of islamic forces projected by the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus.  Monsieur Martel, literally in French meaning “Hammer”, took his place in history for a definitive victory against islamic warriors that for the nearly one hundred years since the death of Mohammad had known only victory and expansion, and is credited with preserving Europe’s western and Christian genus.  Charles Martel is one of the mythic figures of western civilization, presiding at a time of almost no record keeping.  It is, therefore fun to put forward conjectures about this very real individual, and return him briefly, so many years later, to a return the spotlight of history.

     The Islamic tide of expansionism after the death of Mohammad was rapid and spectacular.  Occurring simultaneously under internal strife, the projection across central Asia, Northern Africa, the residual eastern Roman Empire, and western Europe on the Iberian peninsula reached its zenith by the end of the seventh century.  The bonding message of universal devotion to the islamic message, and the creative governance of rulers with both political dexterity and organized military talent was the driving force in creating the rapid consumption of over five million square miles of disparate tribes and cultures.  Europe, in juxtaposition, was a dysfunctional mess of residual elements of the completely worn out Roman influences, warring tribes, illiterate and disorganized populations, and formidable logistics.  Lacking in any shared value system other than the very early influences of the western church, Europe seemed prime ground for further Islamic expansion. 

     Charles Martel is thought to have been born in 688 AD in the Frankish lands of what is now Herstal, Belgium, in the duchy of Austrasia.  He was the illegitimate son of the Duke Pepin of Heristal and his concubine, and therefore had no direct lineage to his eventual role as leader.  Pepin’s death in 714 led to a struggle for ascendancy, and the young Charles found himself in the position initially of prisoner, then ironically, defender of Austrasia, against cousins from the neighboring Duchy of Neustria, seeking to achieve a forced unification of the duchies.  Not the first choice because of his illegitimacy, he proved to be the best choice, as this individual showed almost immediately unique battle skills of field interpretation and generalship that far exceeded his fellow combatants.  Thrust prematurely into an pitched battle for Cologne, the duchy capitol, Charles, with inferior forces, material, and choice of battleground, sustained what proved to be his one and only defeat on a battlefield.  Charles the Warrior, however, was of special stuff.  He showed a willingness to learn from his mistakes, identify opponent weaknesses, and develop completely unexpected tactics that soon overwhelmed his enemies. His loss at Cologne proved to be tactical.  He retreated to the local mountains; replenished and drilled his forces, and then unexpectedly turned on the returning victorious Neustrian forces at Malmedy, routing them, and proceeding to conquer them. He then whirled and defeated his enemies residually in Austrasia, and soon was the unopposed ruler of both duchies.  This illegitimate son of a concubine did what no conqueror typically does – he eschewed his opportunity to be named “king” and instead put forth administrative ‘kings” from his former enemies, while he continued to do what he did best, organize, develop and utilize a progressively invincible army.  His understanding of power, and his lack of personal “need” for a title, places Charles in every modern terms in comparison to the traditions of his time.  King or not, Charles by 732 was in charge of a vast territory from the germanic Elbe river to the border with the Islamic colony in northern Spain, and with a tactical understanding rarely known in his time, recognized the true threats to his lands were not the squabbles of local tribes, but the powerful new force to the south.  He prepared for it with his usual brilliance.

     The Islamic generals were used to facing seasonal soldiers lacking discipline and coordination, and assumed no other capacities of the barbarians to the north.  A brief foray in 721 with a strike force had not been successful at Toulouse, and they determined on their next efforts to conquer Aquitaine, the southern province of the Franks, to bring all their talents and resources to bear.  In 732, at Poitiers near Tours, they meet the forces of Charles the Hammer, and discovered a different kind of opponent.  Charles Martel was a brilliant preparer of troops and a spectacular real time field logician, positioning his highly disciplined troops in strategic positions that accentuated his return of the battlefield of the ancient Grecian phalanx, that with modern armour proved impenetrable to the arab light cavalry, and a talent for feigned retreat and flanking maneuver that was unheard of in his time.  The Hammer put a crushing defeat on the Islamic forces and pushed them back into Iberia, where they showed no further stomach for Charles’ kind of battle.  The battle proved so pivotal, that almost 1300 years after the event, Charles actions are by historians almost universally seen as preventing an Islamic domination over a weakened Europe, setting the stage for feudalism, trade associations, the Renaissance, and the tenets of western civilization this blog reveres today.  King or not, Charles Martel proved to be a colossus of the western ideal.

     Charles Martel was not done with the battle of Tours.  With further consolidation of territories, Charles at the time of his death in 741 stood astride a new Frankish kingdom the expanded the Roman Gaul, and set into place the structure that would become the Holy Roman Empire ruled by his grandson Charlemagne. He instituted the battlefield of the Medieval Age, with permanent armies, fielded with specialists, knights, armour, heavy cavalry, and tactics of siege, discipline, and brutal power.  He is remembered today for what did not develop further in Europe, the all consuming fire that was early Islam, permitting the early seeds of a new culture of individual capacity and creativity to eventually take root and supplant Islam as the citadel of intellectual development.  Charles Martel cared not a wit for titles, but he understood his place in the world and the power necessary to form and develop his vision.  He was one of the first, and very likely, one of the greatest Defenders of the Ramparts of Civilization.